{"id":43120,"date":"2022-01-19T23:45:46","date_gmt":"2022-01-20T04:45:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nearbycafe.com\/artandphoto\/photocritic\/?p=43120"},"modified":"2022-01-20T10:43:44","modified_gmt":"2022-01-20T15:43:44","slug":"guest-post-32-charles-herrick-on-capas-d-day-s-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.nearbycafe.com\/artandphoto\/photocritic\/2022\/01\/19\/guest-post-32-charles-herrick-on-capas-d-day-s-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Guest Post 32: Charles Herrick on Capa\u2019s D-Day (s)"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Kodak[With this post we offer more newly discovered evidence in support of our radical revision of the Capa D-Day myth.<\/em><\/p>\n

Searching further through the USCG film archives, Herrick has now located several more Ruley clips made aboard <\/em>LCI(L)-94 that pertain to Capa’s D-Day narrative. These show the damage to that vessel inflicted by German shelling, to which Capa refers in his several accounts of his experiences during the invasion. Thereby they raise further question regarding the credibility of Capa’s narratives<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Part 2 appears below. Click here for Part 1.<\/a> \u2014 A.D.C.]<\/em><\/p>\n

\u2022<\/p>\n

Damage Report:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Robert Capa and the Shelling of LCI(L)-94<\/strong><\/p>\n

(conclusion)
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

by Charles Herrick<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2022<\/p>\n

Pilot House<\/strong><\/p>\n

… The second relevant scene in US Coast Guard cinematographer David T. Ruley’s film clip<\/a> (beginning at timestamp 00:57) shows the intact base of a projectile lodged in the edge of the porthole in the pilot house of LCI(L)-94<\/em>. (Figure 7).<\/p>\n

\"Figure

Figure 7. The intact base of a projectile (?) lodged into the porthole mounting ring on the forward face of LCI(L)-94’s pilot house. Still from David T. Ruley film clip. (CriticalPast)<\/p><\/div>\n

\u2022<\/p>\n

The projectile appears to be roughly three inches in diameter. Although precise measurement is a bit difficult, this diameter would be consistent with German defenses in the area. WN62, a few hundred yards to the east of LCI(L)-94<\/em>‘s beaching site, contained two guns of 75mm bore (2.95 inches); they were captured Belgium 75mm TR field artillery pieces, styled FK 235(b) in German service.[1]<\/a> They were sited in concrete bunkers to fire westward along the beach, which was precisely the area where LCI(L)-94<\/em> beached. (WN62, the abbreviation for Weiderstandnest 62, was the German designation for the fortifications guarding the west side of the Colleville draw, where Exit E-3 led off the beach.)<\/p>\n

WN62 did also contain an anti-tank gun and a dismounted tank gun, but both of these were of smaller caliber (50mm) and were sited on the east side of WN62 to cover the valley through which the E-3 exit ran; they physically could not come to bear on LCI(L)-94<\/em>‘s beaching site.<\/p>\n

Figure 8 includes two views of sister ships to LCI(L)-94<\/em>, and are included to better illustrate where this hit was located. [Left, original source file: NavSource Online: Amphibious Photo Archive, LCI(L)-96<\/a>. Click here for original image file<\/a>. <\/em>Right, original source file: NavSource Online: Amphibious Photo Archive, LCI(L)-89<\/a>. Click here for original image file<\/a>.]<\/em><\/p>\n

\"Figure

Figure 8. Views of two sister ships to LCI(L)-94, showing where the strike to the ship was located in relation to the rest of the ship\u2019s structure.(NavSource)<\/p><\/div>\n

\u2022<\/p>\n

The projectile’s apparent angle of impact would indicate that the ship was facing nearly head-on to the German cannon at the time it was hit. From Capa’s “One Last Shot of the Beach” photo (and its lesser-known sister photo), it seems that as LCI(L)-94<\/em> retracted from the beach the second time, the captain steered the stern to starboard, thus swinging its bow to port \u2014 east \u2014 and then ordered his engines ahead and had the helm put to port to complete his turn away from the beach. During this maneuver, the forward face of the pilot house would have swung in an arc that, for a few moments, would have been pointed directly at the 75mm gun emplacements on WN62. It was apparently during this part of the maneuver that the ship was hit in the pilot house.<\/p>\n

One detail is difficult to explain: the base of the projectile still lodged in the armor. LCIs were only lightly armored, with the pilot house protected by just 2 inches of plastic armor.[2]<\/a> Although plastic armor was bullet-resistant, it was totally inadequate defense against cannon fire. The projectile we see lodged in the pilot house shouldn’t be there. It should have cleanly penetrated. So, why didn’t it? I can’t say for certain, but we may have a lead. In late May 1944, Rommel noted that the ammunition stores located in the coastal defenses had led to unsatisfactory deterioration of much of the munitions. He ordered stockpiles reduced, with the bulk of the ammunition to be stored under better conditions in army depots.[3]<\/a> This was just two or three weeks before D-Day, and it seems probable that very little had been done to reduce the supplies in the strongpoints, or replace the damaged ammunition with serviceable rounds.<\/p>\n

From Figure 7, we can’t tell much more about the projectile. Was it a solid anti-tank projectile that, due to deteriorated propellant, struck the pilot house at low velocity and failed to completely penetrate the plastic armor? And if this were the case, would it have had sufficient force to cause lethal spalling within the pilothouse? Or was it a high-explosive shell that just barely penetrated into the pilothouse before exploding? And, in that case, would the base of the shell remain lodged where we see it? It doesn’t seem likely.<\/p>\n

But let us step back for a minute and reassess. If it doesn’t seem logical that a projectile would lodge in armor that thin, perhaps it isn’t a projectile. A standard element of every Navy damage-control locker (and presumably USCG as well) was an assortment of conical, soft wood plugs. (Figure 9) Although those were normally used to plug holes below the waterline, it may be that such a plug was jammed into this shell hole to keep the weather out.<\/p>\n

\"Figure

Figure 9. A selection of commercial through-hull soft wood plugs still used today for damage control, and typical of those used by the USCG and Navy in WWII.<\/p><\/div>\n

With this possibility in mind, a closer look at the photo designated as Figure 7, above, seems to show a small mushrooming effect around the circumference of the object at the base, as you’d expect to see when a soft wood peg has been hammered home with force. (Figure 10) The base of a projectile does not normally show that kind of deformation.<\/p>\n

\"Figure

Figure 10. This image is an enlarged detail from Figure 7. The highlighted shadow line indicates an irregular rim projecting beyond the diameter of the rest of the object, consistent with a soft wood that “mushroomed” as a result of being hammered.<\/p><\/div>\n

\u2022<\/p>\n

If it actually is a wood plug, and I believe it is, then the projectile penetrated cleanly though the front armor of the pilot house before detonating, and the full force of the shell’s explosion would have been contained in the pilot house, with devastating results.<\/p>\n

While questions remain about this projectile’s nature, the result was painfully clear. In addition to the casualties, the pilot house lost electrical power, which in turn knocked out electrical steering control and killed the ship’s internal communications. Fortunately, the captain and crew were skilled enough to almost immediately switch to manual steering from the compartment in the stern, directed by means of an improvised chain of sailors who passed along the captain’s verbal orders. As a result, the ship was only slightly delayed in its withdrawal from the beach.<\/p>\n

The Third Shot?<\/strong><\/p>\n

So, how many hits did LCI(L)-94<\/em> sustain? Clifford Lewis (who was not in a position to witness the hits) and Ruley (who was) both claimed the ship was hit three times. Mark Graham (who was also in a position to witness the hits) only cited two. All three of these accounts were recorded within a year of the events, when memories should have been fresh. So who are we to believe?<\/p>\n

Without claiming certainty, I suggest Graham’s account may be more accurate. As a boatswain’s mate, his duties included upkeep of the ship’s external structure, rigging, deck equipment, and damage-control parties. As such, I believe he would have been far more attuned to the exact location of hits and damage resulting from those hits. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that Ruley only filmed damage at two points on the ship. If there had been a third hit, I assume Ruley would have filmed it as well.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, Lewis mentioned that the ship departed the beach missing its port boarding ramp, which had to be cut away. Could this have been a result of a third hit? Or was it jettisoned because the ramp jumped its rollers and became jammed in the deployed position (a not uncommon malfunction with that design)? Again, we can only speculate. Since Graham’s duty station during beaching was at the ramps, I suspect that if one of his ramps had been hit by artillery fire, he would have mentioned it.<\/p>\n

So, lacking other evidence, I think there were just two hits to LCI(L)-94<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Cost<\/strong><\/p>\n

Total damage from the approximately 30 minutes LCI(L)-94<\/em> spent on the beach:<\/p>\n